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The inner dynamics of the multiple actors of the informations systems – i.e, T.V., newspapers, blogs, social
network platforms, – play a fundamental role on the evolution of the public opinion. Coherently with the
recent history of the information system (from few main stream media to the massive diffusion of
socio-technical system), in this work we investigate howmain streammedia signed interaction might shape
the opinion space. In particular we focus on how different size (in the number of media) and interaction
patterns of the information system may affect collective debates and thus the opinions’ distribution. We
introduce a sophisticated computational model of opinion dynamics which accounts for the coexistence of
media and gossip as separated mechanisms and for their feedback loops. The model accounts also for the
effect of themedia communication patterns by considering both the simple casewhere eachmediummimics
the behavior of the most successful one (to maximize the audience) and the case where there is polarization
and thus competition among media memes. We show that plurality and competition within information
sources lead to stable configurations where several and distant cultures coexist.
N
owadays, there is an ongoing intense scientific debate around the definition of the foundational concepts
as well as about themost appropriatemethodological approaches to deal with the understanding of social
dynamics1,2. However, the challenge of understanding human behavior remains complex and intricate.
Humans are intentional (and not necessarily rational) and the their dynamics in the social space are influenced by
the surrounding social context and by the information reported on the media. Tv, newspapers, blogs act on the
memetic diffusion which, in turn, is affected by a massive amount of individual and social factors – e.g. tastes,
desires, goals, trust, social pressure etc. To understand suchmechanisms we have to consider several factors from
how information is produced, up to how the various information sources interact within them (and with respect
to the audience).
Media industries are influenced by business concentration and market segmentation, leading toward heigh-
tened oligopolistic competition, customized delivery of messages, and vertical networking of the multimedia
industry3–5.
In the traditional theory of political communication political influence through themedia is largely determined
by the interaction between the political elites (in their plurality) and professional journalists. Media act as
gatekeepers of the information flows that shape public opinion6 then resulting in collective debates for the
formation of the public opinion.
The recent transformation of the media environment results mainly in the fragmentation of the audience, and
the increasing control that new communication technologies give to the consumers of the media7,8.
Since such an interaction manifests in terms of production and selection of the proposed contents, we
introduce a novel model of opinion dynamics on coupled and interacting networks. We stress the role of the
media communication strategies by considering both the simple case where each media mimics the behavior of
the most successful one – to maximize the audience – and the case where there is polarization and thus
competition among media reported information – to preserve and satisfy the segmented audience and to follow
the editorial line.
The increasinglymassive use of Internet as a source of information and as amedium of communication has led
to a shift of paradigm in the production/diffusion of contents as well as in the communication process. The debate
about social relevant issues spreads and persists over the web by leading to the emergence of unprecedented social
OPEN
SUBJECT AREAS:
COMPLEX NETWORKS
STATISTICAL PHYSICS
Received
26 November 2013
Accepted
19 March 2014
Published
27 May 2014
Correspondence and
requests for materials
should be addressed to
A.S. (antonio.scala@
phys.uniroma1.it)
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 4 : 4938 | DOI: 10.1038/srep04938 1
phenomena such as the massive recruitment of people around com-
mon interests, ideas or political visions9–12. In the past years an
intensive research effort has been payed in understanding social
phenomena from innovation diffusion, to social influence, up to
opinions and their dynamics13–23; some of them have focused on
the role of media24–31 and of the web32,33.
The interaction among media, with the advent of the WWW, has
been subject to an important change: people are not passive anymore,
but can be proactive to an extent that often main stream media
acquire information directly by common people. Main streammedia
compete for the audience and therefore interact by adjusting their
format/contents to collect the highest number of followers. Hence, if
on the one hand people get informed by themedia, on the other hand
the information (as well as the way they are reported) are even more
influenced by the evolution of the mass tastes. Media respond to the
their editors which often are politically lined up and thenwe can have
the emergence of monopoles (as in the case of regimes) or to polar-
ized groups (as in the modern democracies) of information broad-
casters aiming at influencing people toward one or another political
party24,34. The aim of this work is a) to introduce in the field of
opinion dynamics the role of the media dynamics as a results of a
competition/imitation process which has the goal to reach the high-
est number of followers; b) to highlight the changes induced by the
historical evolution of the information system from the traditional
main stream media to the WWW and c) to study the effect of
aggregation/fragmentation of opinions in mixed communication
environment.
Since we want to stress the role of trust with respect to information
available to an individual, we assume that the gossipers interact with
their neighbors and with the media using the bounded confidence
model (BCM)35 – i.e, only if the distance between their internal state
(opinion) and the received information is below a given threshold s
(tolerance) they will be more likely to adjust their own opinion. The
higher the tolerance, the more the people are likely to be influenced
by (because they trust) the information circulating14,36,37.
On the other hand, the media aim to reach the highest number of
followers, hence they change their message according to the attitude
of the media with the highest number of followers. Finally, we intro-
duce competition among media memes38,39 – i.e., we mark the edges
betweenmedia with positive and negative values causing respectively
to converge or diverge respect to their neighbor’s attitudes. We show
plurality and competition within the various information sources
leads to stable configurations where several and distant cultures coex-
ist coherently to the impressive multitude of debates occurring on
socio-technical systems about different topics – e.g politics, econom-
ics or the he existence of chemical trails and reptilians, the new world
order conspiracy and so forth).
Model
We model the information system and its inner dynamics on two
different scenarios inspired by the shift of paradigm from the main
streammedia (when everymedium knows about the format of all the
others) and to the more recent advent of the socio-technical systems
such as Facebook and Twitter (with more complicated connectivity
patterns). The model accounts also for the effect of media commun-
ication patterns by considering both the simple case where each
medium mimics the behavior of the most successful one (to max-
imize the audience) and the case where there is polarization and thus
competition among media memes (to preserve their audience).
Hence, the model discussed in this paper relies on two interacting
networks: the media, which have the goal to collect the highest num-
ber of followers, and the gossipers, which can acquire information
both from other gossipers and by the media.
Even if usually an individual do not choose randamoly his
information sources and his media exposure is opinion based40, for
the sake of simplicity, we assume that the rate with which gossipers
exchange opinions among themselves and consult the media are the
same. At each time-step both gossipers and media can adjust their
opinions (figure 1) and a selective choice of the media, at the level of
the model, would just change the convergence times. Gossipers are
likely to adjust their opinion only if the received information and
their own beliefs are close enough, a situation referred as bounded
confidence. Mathematical models of opinion dynamics under
bounded confidence have been introduced by Axelrod in41 and then
developed by Deffuant et al.35 and by Hegselmann and Krause42.
Inspired by43 media are assumed to deliver information in a leader
follower dynamics – i.e. to be audience oriented by mimicking the
most successful medium in terms of number of customers.
The number of followers – i.e. individuals which accept the
information reported on by the medium – is updated at each time
step.
Each gossiper and media is initially assigned a random opinion
described by a real value within a given opinion space [0..1]. We
consider two interacting networks: the gossiper network Gg and
the media network Gm. Gossipers interact through the bounded
confidence model (BCM) of Deffuant and Weisbuch35 - i.e., at each
time step t a gossiper i chooses at random a neighbor j in its social
network and adjusts its opinion according to
xtz1i ~x
t
izmgg x
t
j{x
t
i
 
h sgg{ x
t
j{x
t
i
   ð1Þ
where xi is the opinion of the gossipers i, mgg is a convergence factor,
sgg is the threshold (opinion distance) above which gossipers do not
interact and h() is Heaviside’s theta function.
We assume that also the interaction with the media has a BCM
form:
Figure 1 | A graphical sketch of ourmodel. (Left panel) Gossipers interact among themselves choosing a neighbor in their social network (double arrow).
If the gossipers have similar ideas, their opinion will converge further (eq.1). (Central panel) Gossipers are also influenced by the media: when they are
exposed to information, their opinion will converge to such information if it is not too far from the gossiper’s initial opinion (eq.2). (Right panel) Media
are subject to a leader-follower dynamics. Media are supposed to have a network of other media with which interact either trying to copy their
memes (black lines) or trying to oppose their memes (red dashed lines). Each media chooses to mimic/oppose the most successful (the one with more
followers) of its neighboring media (eq.3). These drawings have been realized by AS using the open source clip-part collection at http://openclipart.org/.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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i
   ð2Þ
Here k is a randomly chosen media, yk is the information (meme)
reported by the k-thmedia, mgm is a convergence factor and sgm is the
threshold below which gossipers gets influenced by the media.
The media choice at time t is described by the matrix jtik that is
equals to 1 if the i-th gossiper has chosen the k-thmedia, 0 otherwise;
i.e. jtik is a binary random variable that takes the value j
t
ik~1 with
probability 1/M and jtik~0 otherwise. We can therefore count the
followers of each media as
f tk~
X
i
jtikh sgm{ y
t
k{x
t
i
   ð3Þ
where jt is calculated at each time-step.
We then introduce our max-audience oriented bounded confid-
ence model among media interacting on a (possibly signed) network
described by the matrix with elements Jkqg {21, 0, 11}. While the
matrix jJkqj correspond to the adjacency matrix of the network, the
sign of Jkq indicates the polarization (friend/enemy) between the k-th
and the q-the media. The case Jkq $ 0 corresponds to unpolarized
media.
First, the meme of the k-th media is influenced by the most suc-
cessful (the leader) l (k) of its neighbors neigh(k) 5 {q: jJkqj . 0}
l kð Þ~ max
q[neigh kð Þ
Jkq
 fq  ð4Þ
and then its meme is updated accorded a signed version of the BCM
model:
ytz1k ~B ytkzmmmJkl kð Þ ytl kð Þ{ytk
 
h smm{ y
t
l kð Þ{y
t
k
  h i ð5Þ
where the function
B yð Þ~
0 yv0
y if 0vyv1
1 yw1
8><
>: ð6Þ
constrains the memes in the interval [0, 1]. Notice that the use of
periodic boundaries conditions is necessary as for Jkq, 0 the memes
among the k-th and the q-th media tend to diverge and could there-
fore go below 0 or beyond 1. Moreover, using periodic boundary
conditions avoids the problems of extremism (converge of opinions
to 0 or 1) that can be induced by fixed boundary conditions44,45.
The convergence factors mab with a, bg {g,m} correspond to the
timescales of the dynamics. In our study, we always use mab 5 0.3 and
sgg 5 sgm 5 smg 5 s.
Since the opinion space [0, 1] is continuous, we can have different
configuration in the final stationary opinion state. Opinions’ clusters
could be one (consensus), two (polarization), or more (fragmenta-
tion). In the following, we will first consider media as audience
oriented agencies without any particular competition among them
– i.e., a situation in which the opinion of a medium converges to the
most successful among its’ neighbors. Then, we will introduce com-
petition among media memes – i.e., according to the structural bal-
ance of Heider46, wemark the edges betweenmedia with positive and
negative values as in47–49 causing respectively a step toward or far
from the most followed neighboring medium.
Results and Discussion
The analytical approach reveals that the ourmodel is not amenable of
a simple analytical solution not even at the mean-field level (see
Methods for more details); therefore, we have resorted on numerical
investigations. More precisely, we performed a thorough simulation
program which considers different connectivity patterns for the two
interacting layers acting on the opinion space (gossipers and media
networks). We first show the opinion dynamics in the case where
gossipers are subject to the audience oriented media broadcasting.
Then, we introduce competition (polarization) in the media
dynamics - i.e, each node of the media network, depending on the
edge signature (positive or negative), can diverge (or converge) to (or
from) the value of the most followed media. Accordingly to the
information system historical evolution50–52 both the audience-
oriented and the competing media cases are first considered in the
complete graph case. This is the case of traditional main stream
media where everybody knows about everybody. Finally, we consider
the model’s dynamics when nodes of the media networks are linked
through more complex connectivity patterns like in the case of the
WWW. The nodes of the gossipers network interact over a scale-free
network generated with the Barabasi-Albert model53 that sets the
exponent of the power law distribution to be 3.0. We explored also
other connectivity patterns (Watts-Strogatz small world networks54
with different rewiring probability) noticing that the underlying
topology does not affect the model qualitative behavior. We explore
the model dynamics in terms of opinion distance and number of
clusters as a function of the tolerance parameter. Each point of the
parameter space (5000 steps) is averaged over 100 different possible
initial configurations to attain the desired accuracy. When not spe-
cified, the size of the networks is to be assumed to be 104 nodes. The
size of actors in traditional main-streammedia (TMSM) is small: the
number of televisions, radio stations, newspapers etc. allows every-
body to check what the others are doing. For this reason, we will
model interactions among the TMSM as a complete graph.
We first analyze the trend of opinions’ extremal distances d – i.e.,
the distance between the highest and the lowest opinions in the
gossipers’ network – as a function of the tolerance s. When d 5 0,
all the gossipers have reached consensus and share the same opinion
while for d. 0, opinions are distributed; in the case of the standard
BCM model, opinions are distributed in clusters (delta functions)
separated by a distance higher than s.
In Figure 2 we show the trend of the opinion distance (the highest
opinion distance) as a function of the tolerance when the gossipers’
network is scale-free53. We have checked that qualitatively similar
results hold for the other gossip network topologies. It is known that
the increasing of the tolerance parameter causes a reduction of the
distance within opinions until it reduces to consensus – i.e, when the
distance is 0 – and that the critical point (without media) is reached
for value of tolerance of 0.555.
Here, we show that the media action smoothens the transition. In
fact, the presence of the media as audience oriented information
agencies can enlarge the transition area before the consensus to a
Figure 2 | Maximal opinion distance d (the difference between the
highest and lowest opinion in the gossipers’ network) versus tolerance s.
The size of the symbols is bigger than the error bars. Opinions’ distance
under the effect of audience-oriented unpolarized media shows a
smoothening of the transition (less sharp change of d versus s).
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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single opinion. Such an effect is more evident for a small number of
media. Under this settings media always reach a stationary state
where they deliver the same message. The size only affects the time
to converge. The imitation the most successful one triggers a leader-
follower dynamics driven by the opinion clusters having the highest
fraction of users. Such an interaction pattern produces conformity in
the opinion space. Only when the time needed to the media to con-
verge is lower than the time needed to the emergence of a dominant
cluster in the opinion space, the media plays the role of an external
field that smoothens the phase transition toward consensus.
In fact, the situation is completely different when we introduce
competition (polarization) in the media information targeting
mechanisms. With this feature media can have negative or positive
feedbacks from the other media; therefore the most popular medium
can cause either a convergence (positive coupling) or divergence
(negative coupling) of its neighbors’ memes. For the sake of simpli-
city we set to 0.5 the fraction of negative links of the media network –
i.e, the number of links that will cause divergence with respect to the
most followed media message.
To measure the possible sparsity of opinions induced by the nega-
tive links, we bin the opinion space in a probability vector w and
measure the localization parameter56:
L~
P
i
w2i
	 
2
P
i
w4i
ð7Þ
IfMB is the (large) number of bins of the probability vector, L, 1/MB
, 0 if the opinions are evenly distributed, while L 5 1 if all the
opinions are concentrated in a single bin. In general, if opinions
are evenly distributed in NC clusters, L21 , NC is of the order of
the number of different opinions.
The left panel of Figure 3 shows that for unsigned interactions
among media, all the opinions converge to a single one, i.e. L 5 1 for
high values of s. Notice that in the case of a large number of unpo-
larized media, two opinion clusters (L , 0.5) coexist at small s’s
(roughly between s 5 0.05 and s 5 0.10). The smoothening effect
of not competing media however is visible at low level of trust (small
ss) where we observe a very short plateau. The right panel of Figure 3
shows a re-entrant effect in which the opinion space is highly frag-
mented for both low and high values of the tolerance s. However,
such fragmentation stems from different mechanisms; in fact, while
at low s opinion fragment into distinct non-interacting peaks as in
the standard BCM, at high values of tolerance the opinions fragment
because the competition among polarized memes. Low levels of trust
in the circulating information allow for a broad distribution of the
various opinions in the gossipers’ ecosystem. Conversely, with
increasing of trust, users are more prone to accept circulating memes
that, in turn, lead to the formation of isolated clusters when their
distribution is sparse. In fact, at high swe find that while the average
number of opinion peaks is stationary, their positions in the opinion
space are dynamically fluctuating. Therefore, in the case of polarized
media, even total trust in the information (s 5 1) does not produce
full consensus as in the standard BCM, but induces a dynamically
evolving stationary state in which users can still change their
opinions.
The use of the Internet as a medium for sharing information has
caused a shifting of paradigm frommain stream centralized media to
a more distributed and proactive protocol of information diffusion.
At difference with traditional main-stream media, new media are
composed of a large number of actors that cannot possibly check
all the other media but that interact among each other through a
social network. Hence, in this last scenario we use different topolo-
gies for the media network – i.e, of 104 nodes with scale-free and
small-world topologies (the latter with rewiring probabilities p5 0.1,
0.2, 0.3) – acting on a gossip scale-free gossip network of the same
size. We analyze both polarized (audience oriented) and unpolarized
(competing) media; in the former case, for the sake of simplicity we
set to 0.5 the fraction of negative links in the media network. Figure 4
shows the behavior of the localization for scale free media networks
and small world topologies, both for the polarised and the unpo-
larised case. The high number of media makes extreme the effects
evinced in the previous scenarios. However, the effects of the network
structure isminor since curves for are qualitatively and quantitatively
similar both for polarised and unpolarised media.
We observe that the result for new media are qualitatively similar
to the ones for the traditional main-stream media: in both cases
competition among the media (polarization) introduces a non
monotonic behavior in opinions’ fragmentation, gossipers never
reach consensus and the minimum opinion spread is reached for
values of tolerance s , 1.
Despite different connectivity patterns – scale free AB networks
are very different from the more clustered WS – the dynamics pre-
Figure 3 | Localization L versus tolerance s. Error bars are of the order of the symbol size. The localization parameter can be thought as the inverse of the
number of different opinion; therefore L 5 1 for consensus, while a low value of L signals fragmentation of the opinions. (Left panel) Localization in
gossip scale-free networks increases with the tolerance when the media are audience oriented agencies (i.e. unpolarized). Notice that full consensus (L 5
1) is reached at a tolerance , 0.5 like the single-network BCM model case. (Right panel) Localization has a non-monotonic trend when media are
polarized; in particular, it reaches amaximum before the tolerance is maximal (s5 1). Like in the BCMmodel, opinions are fragmented at low values of s
since they do not interact; unlike the BCMmodel, consensus is not reached at high values of s and opinions are fragmented due to the polarization of the
media.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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sent a very similar behavior. They evolve with a similar pattern which
– in the case of unpolarized media – presents a plateau at small value
of s due to the smoothening effect caused by the media which are
deliverying competing messages with a small probability to affect
users opinion. The different values of the clustering coefficient result
in a small broadening in the opinions’ distribution: the higher the
clustering the larger the opinions’ distribution. This is due to the
formation of small groups on the same opinions which increases
with the transitivity among gossipers.
Conclusions
In this paper we introduce a novel model of opinion dynamics
accounting for the coexistence of media and of social influence as
two separated but interdependent processes. People (nodes of the
gossip network) interact with their neighbors or with themedia using
the Bounded Confidence Model (BCM)35 – i.e, only they will influ-
ence each other only if the distance between their opinions is below a
given threshold s (tolerance), the higher s, the more people are likely
to be influenced. In turn, the media (nodes of the media network)
aim to capture the highest number of followers, hence they change
their message by moving toward the value of the media with the
highest number of followers. Finally, we introduce competition
among media through polarization - i.e., media can interact with
positive sign (their memes will converge) or negative sign (their
memes will diverge).
We show that, when the media follow an audience oriented strat-
egy of information delivery (i.e. everybody tries to mimic the most
successful medium), there is a smoothening of consensus transition,
indicating that themedia messages tend to produce an impasse when
amplified by the gossip dynamics. Such effect tends to disappear with
increasing the number of media. On the other hand, competition
(polarization) among media produces a fragmentation of the opi-
nions’ space thus preventing a system-wide consensus. Such scenario
is qualitatively robust to changes in the topologies of the gossip-
gossip and medium-medium interaction network; in particular, it
stays true both for conventionalmedia (where everybody can interact
with everybody) and for newmedia (where interactions take the form
of a social network). Finally, we notice that our choice of keeping
equal the s values is better suited to disentagle the contribution of the
competition among themedia to opinion fragmentation. Varying the
tolerance parameters, other routes could be possible; as an example, a
very small tolerance smm among the media (conservative media)
could keep opinions fragmented even for tolerances sgg among the
gossipers beyond the consensus transition.
The next envisioned step will be to fine tune our model with real
data from social networks platforms where main stream media
directly interact with users and together change continuously the
opinions’ as well as the information space.
Methods
* Algorithm. The gossip network Gg 5 (Vg, Eg) is composed by N 5 jVgj gossipers;
the edges Eg represent social contacts among gossipers. Nodes of the gossip network
interact with randomly selected a neighbor by applying the following rule: Given a
node i that has selected a node j, having respectively opinion xi and xj (the opinion
varies in a continuous space between 0.0 and 1.0)
for all ig Vg do
select random neighbor j
if xti{x
t
j
 vsgg then
xtz1i /x
t
izmgg  xtj{xti
 
where sgg is the threshold parameter (the distance between one is likely to consider
the others opinions) and mgg is a convergence parameter varying in the interval
(0, 1/2].
The media network Gm 5 (Vm, Em) is composed byM 5 jVmjmedia and follows a
similar rule except for the tolerance control. Each node a of themedia network has an
opinion ya selects in its neighborhood the one that has the highest number of fol-
lowers (audience) and then apply the updating. Given two media i, jg Vm
for all ag Vm do
select most influential neighbor b
if ytb{y
t
a
 vsmm then
ytz1a ~y
t
azmmm  Jab  ytb{yta
 
if ytz1a v0 then
ytz1a ~0
if ytz1a w1 then
ytz1a ~1
where Jab 5 61 represent the polarization among the media.
The set of edges Egm,Vg 3 Vm represents the media followed by the gossipers; i.e.
an edge (i, a)g Egmmeans that gossiper i can be influenced by themedia a. The inter-
network dynamics takes place by gossipers choosing at random a media among the
ones they follow:
for all ig Vg do
select random media a
if xti{y
t
a
 vsgm then
xtz1i /x
t
izmgm  yta{xti
 
Thus, each node of the gossip network talks with his friend and then gets informed by
the media (by randomly selecting one node from the media network) In such a
mechanism: a) a leader-follower dynamics emerges among media the messages
delivered by the media; b) the gossip network and the media network have a feedback
Figure 4 | Localization L versus tolerance s for Barabasi-Albert scale-free (BA) and Watts-Strogatz small world (WS) networks with rewiring
probabilities p5 0.1, 0.2, 0.3. Error bars are of the order of the symbol size. The complex networks of gossipers and media are of comparable sizes. (Left
panel) For un-polarized media, increasing the tolerance leads toward consensus (L 5 1). (Right panel) Polarization among the media produces a
reentrant effect on the localization: while at low values of s opinions are fragmented since they do not interact, at high values of the tolerance polarization
induces fragmentation.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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loop. Notice that we have checked that the update sequence does not influence the
results of the dynamics.
* Mean field equations. A simple analytical tool that help to understand the main
features of network-based models like our coupled BCM are the mean field (MF)
approximations.
We will first sketch the MF solution in the general case of a BCM subject to a time
dependent external field (information from the media). Let {xi} be the N opinions of
the crowd and {yk} the M opinions (memes) of the media with xi, ykg (0, 1). Let’s
suppose that at each step an individual i can get information by another randomly
chosen person jwith probability ag or by a randomly chosen media kwith probability
am, with ai 1 am 5 1. The individual then gets influenced by the other opinion with
probability cg (x, y) by individuals and cm (x, y) by media:
xi?
xizmgg xj{xi
 
with probability ag :cg x,yð Þ
xizmgm hk{xið Þ with probability am:cm x,yð Þ
(
ð8Þ
where cg and cm are functions that measure the interaction strenghts among different
opinions. Notice that the standard BCM corresponds to ag 5 1 and cg (x, y) 5 1 2 h
(sgg 2 jx 2 yj), where h (x) is the Heavyside theta-function and sgg is the tolerance
parameter of the BCMmodel. Let pg (x, t) and pm (x, t) be the probability distribution
of individual opinions and of media opinions at time t. Rescaling the time by the
average rate at which individuals receive informations, the evolution of the individual
opinion distribution pg (x, t) is described by the master equation
Ltpg x,tð Þ~
ð
dy
ð
dz pg y,tð Þ
X
s[ g,mf g
ascs y,zð Þ ps z,tð Þ
d x{mg sz{ 1{mg s
 
y
 
{d x{yð Þ
h i ð9Þ
Notice that in the BCM case with the standard choice mgg 5 1/2, eq. 9 reduces to the
MF equations
Ltpg x,tð Þ~
ð
dy
ð
y{zj jvsgg
dz pg y,tð Þpg z,tð Þ
d x{
yzzð Þ
2
	 

{d x{yð Þ
  ð10Þ
derived for the BCM model by Ben-naim and coauthors57. Let’s now consider for
simplicity the case in which cg (x, y) 5 cm (x, y) 5 1 2 h (s 2 jx 2 yj) and the
distribution of media opinions is time independent. It is easy to check that to the field
pm xð Þ~
X
d x{ykð Þ with jyk 2 ylj . s mk, l there corresponds the stationary
solution pg (x) 5 pm (x). Notice that the MF approximation comes from disregarding
joint correlations among the opinions, i.e.
p xi1 ,xi2 , . . . ,xiLð Þ~P
L
k~1
p xikð Þ ð11Þ
Wewill now consider the general case in which the dynamics of the media is coupled
to the dynamics of the opinions. Such a case can be described by adding to eq. 9 an
equation for the field evolution
Ltpm y,tð Þ~F pg ,pm,t
  ð12Þ
where in the MF approximation F is a functional of the pa only. For the media-media
leader-follower dynamics, one has to understand which is the meme that has the
maximum number of followers. Disregarding fluctuations, this can be calculated
as
hmax~ sup
h
pm yð Þ
ðhzs
h{s
pg xð Þdx ð13Þ
and the dynamics for the memes is
Ltpm y,tð Þ~
ð
dz pm z,tð Þcm z,hmaxð Þ
d y{mmmz{ 1{mmmð Þhmaxð Þ{d y{zð Þ½ 
ð14Þ
Eq. 13 makes the mean-field system of equation not amenable of simple solutions.
A further refinement of theMF approachwould be needed in the case of competing
media: in such a case, it is well known that even at the MF level more complicated
techniques like the cavity method or the replica trick are needed to solve systems with
competing interactions58,59.
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